peter krey's web site

scholarship, sermons, songs, poems, weblog writing on

“The Social Impact of Luther’s Teachings for Today” Concept 2000, Second San Jose Lecture

leave a comment »

Second Lecture

The Social Impact of Luther’s Teachings for Today

November 10, 1997 (Martin Luther’s Birthday)

It would be possible to present a very traditional introduction into some of Luther’s teachings: He was not a systematic theologian, because he was a doctor of the Old Testament, a professor who developed his theology from exegeting and studying Scripture. That is what composes his Word of God Theology, which firstly, is declared as justification by faith, alone. The effect of the Word, secondly, comes about in the distinction of the law and the gospel, God’s commands over against God’s promises. The civil use of the law creates order and checks evil outwardly, the theological use of the law drives us to Christ for life. And thirdly, the Word is always hidden in the flesh. This scandal is called the Theology of the Cross. It means far more than that Jesus died on the cross for our sins. The Theology of the Cross is a whole way of knowing and perceiving God’s way with us. In the last chapters of Genesis, Joseph receives the promise from God to become a king, and God fulfills it by having him sold down the river into Egyptian slavery. God’s good things are found under the cross.[26]

But first of all, that kind of a presentation is not appropriate for a group that calls itself Concept 2000. And secondly, Prof. Robert Goeser from PLTS, is convinced that these terms like justification by faith, law and gospel, first, second, and third uses of the law, Theology of the Cross, have all become Lutheran slogans that prevent us from understanding their personal and social impact for today as well as what Luther really meant by them in yesteryear for his social and historical context. And Luther has subsequently been run through Scholasticism, Pietism, Rationalism, Liberalism – and some of these commentators even read some of his writings.

What can be accomplished in this short lecture? Let me tell about an interpretation of the Reformation as the first modern ideology, try to deal with the historical distortion entailed in the argument that the abuse of power which the Reformation took away from the church was merely handed over to the state. That misses the new attitude of the Reformation that attributed integrity to the secular realm and replaced monastic detachment with a new level of religious penetration of the world.[27] Let me just touch upon studies that interpret Luther’s theology as a theology of liberation, and personal and social considerations involved with the complexity of change, and the problem of “completing” it. Finally I would like to end with three modern correlations of three of Luther’s teachings for today. That is a bit much, but if necessary we can finish next time.

Euan Cameron argues that the Reformation was the first modern ideology, here still a religious one. The Word of God Theology seems to fit nicely into that interpretation. The Reformation, he argues, took a core idea, like justification by faith, and subjected it to public debate, used it to test the validity and correctness of any religious act – whether public or elite, it still had to be in conformity to this teaching – and finally, by means of the core idea, it simplified religion by completely rebuilding the structures of Western Christianity. Catholics could of course leave the Middle Ages and popular pre-industrial world by other routes, but the Reformation gave large groups of people across Europe their first lesson in political commitment to a universal ideology.[28]

There is an uncanny way the core idea of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin gave a unity to belief, teaching, religious practice, and social impact in the various realms their polemics influenced. The social impact is still controversial. In how so far the Reformation succeeded in redefining the state,[29] is thinkable to some, but unthinkable to those historians who see the basic momentum in society coming from a class struggle, and see the Reformation playing right into the hands of the aristocracy which controlled both the church and the state, in their perspective. But Cameron seems to be on my side, when he notes that the Reformation took some countries out of the Middle Ages into Early Modern times. It took the medieval world to the threshold of the modern one.

To set this socio-economic class argument aside and to deal with the political argument against the Reformation: it only delivered the abuse of power from the church into the hands of the state. That seems to agree with my point that a kind of clericalism changed into a religious secularism. But what does that mean? I believe the Reformation brought a new foray of faith into the inner-worldly of secular realm. Weber and Troeltsch call it inner worldly asceticism. I noted Weber’s concept of immanent monasticism. An hypothesis might be investigated that the dissolution of the monasteries in England created a vacuum in which secular industrialization originated. (This is possible only if one is permitted to view the latter from a broader sociological, rather than purely historical, perspective.) But I consider it unfair to argue that the Reformation merely replaced higher clergy with a political elite.[30] To be sure, the Reformers had to institutionalize and establish their religious beliefs and practices, or their work would have been extinguished and all but forgotten today.[31] The political order of the day, left very much to be desired, but because of the Reformation religious conviction began to engage these economic, social, and political realities in a new way. Initiates faded and died in many places, but Holland and England show places where these initiatives blossomed, despite the Philip II of Spain, the Duke of Alba, and the Spanish Armada.

That perspective that finds the Reformation taking the power away from the church and playing right into the hands of the secular lords – misses something significant. From a Protestant view, of course, the other-worldliness, detachment, and escapism of monasticism[32] was replaced by an inner-worldly vocational faith which Patrick Collinson called “centripetal.”[33] Although he uses the word for Calvinism, it applies to Luther also, who wrote he wanted a theology “which goes to the meat of the nut, the kernel of the grain, and the marrow of the bone….”[34] Luther experienced faith as a force that tended toward total involvement and engagement with the world. It is another paradigm altogether from detachment, distance, and objectivity where lineal logic is used to communicate to subjects outside each other. Luther’s dialectic penetrated to the inside, required a total immersion, way out over Luther’s head, an intimacy that massaged each nuance into more conviction and faith. Luther does not have a system so much as a language, a consciousness embodied in words, a dialectic with fluid concepts capable of transforming a great number of institutional structures.[35] See the catalog that Steven Ozment draws up in terms of the religious institutions that the Reformation left behind: celibacy, monasticism, the Latin mass, canon law, five sacraments, papal and territorial episcopal government, etc.[36] He notes that these were massive changes in the religious life-world of the people enfolded by the Reformation.

The political argument misses the significant point that the Reformation gave the secular its own integrity, and released it from external ecclesiastical trappings designed to create dependency to clerics who confused religious conviction with external ecclesiastical worldliness. The people of the Reformation felt violated by the canon law and the papacy. They wanted a more intrusive and deeper religious penetration of the world along with a commitment and responsibility for the matters of the world, a point of view from which monastic detachment seemed sinful.[37] In other words, it was not the church that God so loved that He gave his only begotten Son, etc. Not the church reconciled to God in Christ, but the world, so loved and reconciled. Luther’s centripetal theological thrust intended to transform a medieval religious externalism into a religious internalism.

What a distortion to only avow that the Reformation merely replaced the higher clergy with a political elite! Martin Heckel notes that that misses the incarnational dimension,[38] as well as the theory of vocation and office. Because of the internal dimension one can begin to speak of roles: the society in the role of the church, the society in the role of the state, and the society per se. Or think of a person in the role of a priest, in the role of a subject of a prince, and later of a citizen. That internal dimension and its religiously charged core is what the Reformation was about, and it is capable of any number of revolutions.

To us a religious secularism is an oxymoron. In those days it took faith out of abstract universals and moved it into concrete particulars…and the point is not to escape the particulars in the universal, but to go through and beyond the particular to the concrete universal.[39]

I am engaging in an argument with those who read our problems with secularism, which are very real, back into those more clerical days. It cannot be argued that the Reformation represented a full blown social revolution. The problem of a top down versus a grass roots movement is very problematic, as is the failure to provide political structures in which the “common man” could have a voice. But the charge that the Reformation was incomplete needs much more thought and further distinction. A change of social structures can be as futile as a narrow focus on personal transformation alone. Talk of changing a system does not realize the exorbitant complexity of modern society, and even the society in the days of the Reformation. And it is an aberration to believe that an ideological change can bring completeness to a movement. Even should changes in social, economic, and political structures and personal transformation be accomplished, Weber notes that a moral challenge will still confront a real person, and no change will take away the challenge to the person to respond humanly, for the good and not evil.[40] No revolution can relieve people from responsibility. There is no system given whereby we must be saved,[41] although some can prevent very much human fulfillment because of their injustice.

For example, using Emile Durkheim’s theories, we could try to bolster some intermediate commission between communities and corporations. They represent sheer social anarchy, because no conscious human agency is directing them nor does such an agency provide a watershed of information for them.[42] He argues that the government should not take this role, because it would be corrupted by it. And these commissions should not dominate business, but be a head to that dynamic body, so to speak. Such a conscious center could begin to address the social distress concomitant with great economic changes over which the many who are affected have no control.

Such a democratic economic structure might be helpful, but in no sense would it be complete without people responding to their convictions, their religious calling that bids them choose life even at the cost of it, should they need to stand because they can do no other.

I submit that Luther did set a religious revolution into motion. Several authors in face of Luther’s cry for the “Freedom of the Christian Person,” try to ascertain in how so far Luther is doing liberation theology.[43] Some of the similarities between Luther’s theology and liberation theology are striking. Luther’s theology is occasional, (working with a concrete historical situation rather than realities in general). Thus it does not become guilty of universal assertions proscribing “the” reality, the way many dominant western systematic theologies do. (In his Table Talks, Luther said, “The doctors try to make me a fixed star, while I am a [wandering] planet!”)[44]. Like liberation theology, Luther was trying to overcome structural oppression, more particularly, that of the church. But much of the injustice of the day was rooted precisely in the clericalism of the church. The character of Luther’s theology was not systematic but dialectical. The hierarchy of concepts entailing systematic theology grasps and dominates and controls, while Luther’s dialectic attempts to be drawn into the divine Word, be grasped by it, surrender to it, and become part of its dynamic movement for social change. Luther’s theology also centers around St. Paul’s Galatians “Manifest of Christian Freedom.”[45] To bring up his Bondage of the Will, fails to understand that in his dialectics, bondage before God (coram deo) means freedom among people (coram hominibus), while freedom before God, brings bondage on the horizontal plane. Beyond liberation theology, Luther’s theology is also performative, in the sense of using language to bring social change. I concur with a Lutheran Marxist speaking to clergy in Berlin in the early seventies: Luther did not merely want to reform theology and personal lives. The title of his work read: “An Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation concerning the Betterment of the Christian Estate.”[46] And perhaps he gave us some guidelines helpful for even today.

Let me touch upon three teachings of Luther for which I would like to present correlations that impact our society today. Of course I am not being traditional. I should take the time to explain what his teaching are in the first place. But here is my excuse: these lectures are for Concept 2000. I would like to show how the theory of Juergen Habermas concerning the life-world against the encroachments of the economic and political systems is a very sophisticated two kingdom theory for today. Secondly, consider a dialectical internalism of the different fora, (the plural of forum in Latin). And thirdly, let me explain how justification by faith works in our social and economic situation today.


Justification by Grace versus Works-Righteousness

Listening to Public Radio makes me feel guilty because I have not contributed as I should. 94.1 FM featured three women psychotherapists speaking about shame and poverty in America. They noted that our social classes were shame based, and this shame represented a very destructive force in our society. Having just studied Luther’s attempt to relegate the congruent and condign merits of Scholastic theology to oblivion, when they started talking about the myth of meritocracy in our society, my ears perked up. Luther would not grant that some had merit and others not, but everybody equally needed to look up to Christ for grace. Suddenly I realized that Judith Jordan, Jean Baker Miller, and Janet Surrey working from the Stone Center in Massachusetts, were speaking about an inner-worldly justification by faith.

In our society, if you are rich, you are considered intelligent, industrious, and virtuous. And you certainly deserve the millions that you get, especially if you are a C.E.O. taking your ship through troubled waters. You are a one man show, and thousands of workers depend on your decisions in the empire of your multi-national global corporation.

Now if you are poor you should be ashamed of yourself. Poverty is a crime per se. You have no merit, no validity. You are lazy, stupid, immoral, or worse. You must want to be poor or you wouldn’t be. You deserve a life that is nasty, brutish, and short. (I got carried away. They stopped slightly short of that.)

Those remarks are rather harsh – but they reflect the climate in these days in our country, sometimes, quite faithfully. And this attitude is completely without grace – as you notice, I selected that word carefully.

Because not only is God insulted by those who discount divine grace, but this ideology is highly deceptive, and designed to control people and exploit them, who can never stop working, but who also find no security through working. They know they could be downsized tomorrow no matter how hard they work. (That is the failure of works-righteousness in a new sense.)

What a deception! That the C.E.O. accomplishes something does not preclude that the real initiatives are actually taken elsewhere in the company, and he merely receives the credit for them, the way Hoover got the blame for the depression. Perhaps some democratization could be introduced into a corporation, because after all, it is not a ship, but may be a community of sorts, even if it is instrumental. But further, many rich people have climbed over dead bodies to have the power they do, and a virtuous billionaire may be an oxymoron. Most often you hear about vipers in a viper pit in their board meetings. And in how so far does one deserve an inheritance of great wealth just because one was born into a rich family? And what makes such a person intelligent? Or look at a homemaker. Not a popular job these days! Job. Who ever got paid for it? “Do you work?”

“No. I only raise the children, and run the household, do all the cooking, wash, and cleaning. I do not work.”

What is wrong with this picture?

Thus with St. Paul and Luther we have to conclude that we are justified by grace through faith. It is a gift of God, and not attained by our work, and thus no one can boast economically or theologically. That we are all sinners who have fallen short of the glory of God gives a commonality to the C.E.O. as well as the most humble homemaker, and the hierarchical walls in the corporation, the class walls in our society, held up by the myth of merit, have to fall. All of us stand equally before God in the need of grace. (Note that I am aware that in the systems we do have an opposing principle, the principle of justification by work. But this instrumentality cannot colonize the life-world, where human relationships obtain, and persons are not a means to an end, but are all ends in themselves. (Kant)

Interestingly enough Judith Jordan argues that shame is designed to silence people and take away their voice, make them silent. She distinguishes guilt from shame in that the latter comes from involuntary action, while the former stems from voluntary acts of commission or omission against our conscience. Shame assaults our very being![47] Here she provides Luther with some modern language to explain his passive stance before God who refashions his very being, dressing it in a new integrity, the righteousness of Christ, thus overcoming all guilt (proper sin) and shame (original sin), and giving the person a new voice. “I saw the gates of heaven open, and a whole new face of the Scriptures! The righteousness of Christ is that by which he makes us righteous.”[48] We become the good trees who bear good fruit. When those who control us shame us they lock us out of relationship, take away our own ability to trust that we have a say so over our own reality. They want to silence all other voices so that their dominant reality becomes the reality.[49] And all voices are reduced to silence by shame, and one C.E.O. has thousands depending upon him for their livelihoods.


Uncoupling of the Systems and Colonizing the Life Word

Habermas has been called one of the two greatest sociologists in the world today, along with Pierre Bourdieu. In his theory about the life-world and the two systems of today, I see a sophisticated two kingdom theory, one so very misunderstood today. He argues that the life-world is based on communication, agreement, and consensus. The economic and political systems require instrumental rationality for the sake of control. In his theory situations are embedded in broader “horizons” which are in turn grounded in the life-world.

From a linguistic angle, “communicative actors always move within the horizon of their life‑world” ‑‑ a life‑world which now can be defined as “a culturally transmitted and a linguistically organized reservoir of meaning patterns.”[50]

The added complexity of this definition need not detain us now. But everyday praxis yields three life‑world spheres: 1/ culture 2/ society 3/ personality.

Where culture denotes a reservoir of shared knowledge and pre‑interpretations, society a fabric of normative rules, and personality a set of faculties or “competences” enabling an individual to speak and to act.[51]

Modernization, roughly, is the replacement of implicit by explicit meaning patterns.

When Luther speaks of being able to distinguish the law from the gospel, and notes how the devil wants to confuse the kingdoms in order to destroy the creation, Habermas speaks about the colonization of the life-world by the systems. Modernization does not entirely coincide with the differentiation of communicative structures or components for Habermas, according to Dallmayr, because material production cannot be discounted. Long range social development involves not only the internal diversification of life‑world components but also the growing segregation of symbolic‑communicative patterns from productive endeavors governed by standards of technical efficiency.  This is a process which can be described as an “uncoupling” of the systems and the life‑world, to use difficult Habermasian language, needing more explanation: Once systems are no longer merely coordinated with communicative patterns but begin to invade and subdue these communicative patterns of the life-world, then the uncoupling of the systems and life‑world is converted into the direct “colonization of the life‑world.” That means it is subjugated to alien standards of technical control.[52] The life world begins to be eclipsed and absorbed in instrumental rationality, making persons become means to political and economic ends not in their interest, nor under their control. A climate of communal agreement is necessary in the life‑world, whereas systemic imperatives prevail in the systems. In the life-world, force [in the sense of coercion] and discourse cannot be connected. The life-world is at no one’s disposal. As the higher value it needs to be guarded from the systems.[53]

Habermas can be used to see the marketplace colonizing the academy, basic information, and news, entertainment, government. Does a university turn out products? Are we products who have to sell ourselves? Have things become ends in themselves, and human beings become disposable? That resembles, I submit, in modern social theory, the evil wreaked by the confusion of the two kingdoms, according to the theory of Luther.


Life before the Eyes of Others, Oneself, and God

The third helpful corollary for today from Luther’s theology concerns the coram deo, hominibus, meipso, and mundi fora, each a different internal personal stance. On my own journey becoming a person in some quite difficult inner‑city ministry, I came to the conviction that ultimately I am not the person others see me to be, nor the one I think I am, but the person God calls me to be, the person God calls into existence. Thus I cannot give others the power to define my identity, nor feel that my self‑definition is the last word. Who I am is defined by the Word of God.

Gerhard Ebeling presents Luther’s extensively developed fora,[54] and, surprisingly enough, Luther’s thought takes my undeveloped schema much farther. The fora also explain Luther’s virtuosity of simultaneously held inner roles, and his nuanced dialectic, which is capable of thinking out of these various positions and the mutual relations they presuppose.

Coram deo is standing before God, in the sight of God; coram hominibus is the forum in the sight of others; coram meipso, standing before myself, myself in my own eyes; and coram mundi is my image, my public image in the world. Turning one’s back to others, on one stage, is required in order to turn toward God and live one’s life in God’s sight, before the face God, coram deo, the higher stage. Living in God’s sight we have conscience, because when God looks at us with disfavor, we know we have done wrong. This conscience relativizes the “looks” we get from others or even the esteem we hold ourselves in. To live in the definition of others and in the sight of others, in the sense of becoming determined by them, e.g., “keeping up with the Jones'” or “What will the neighbors think?” is a life lived with one’s back toward God. One might think that having the privileged inner perception into one’s own self, would give one a real advantage in self knowledge. But truthfully, we are as ignorant of ourselves (in self‑knowledge) as we are blind to the character of others, until coram deo, we begin to see and know ourselves, even the way God knows us.[55] It is God who knows our naked self as we really are, and God who accepts us as we are, before we can accept ourselves. And it is quite a harrowing experience, if a great disjuncture exists between our ideal self and our actual very inadequate and unacceptable self.

Now these fora are all simultaneously within us, and one is in the foreground while another is in the background, or one is dominant, while another is secondary, or we focus on one and not  the other. Some persons are determined or defined by other persons; they find their existence in the sight of another or others, in this parlance. Bismarck, the German chancellor, is said to have been quite the opposite. He had such a strong sense of identity in his own eyes, that when the Reichstag went into an uproar, shouting and remonstrating about the shamelessness of his statements, he would calmly take out a news paper and read it until they became quiet, then continue his speech where he had left off.

With these fora Luther opened a new internal personal and social dimension. To repeat, as internal stands or places, they are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that one can be in only one forum at a time. A person can have all the fora in mind at once and be reacting differently for each. Sometimes “turning around” means coram hominibus has to be excluded for coram deo, but because of that, the right relationship, value, and perspective will obtain in coram hominibus, as well as in the other fora, meipso, et mundi.

Whether Luther inherited these categories or invented them himself, I do not know. Luther was a great scholar, and often because we first encounter ideas reading his work, we think he invented them. But whether he coined these fora or not, he certainly put his own stamp on them by his meditative insight of (what I call) his depth theology. The relationality and mutuality these categories bring to his thought are very helpful for today, when disconnection dissolves relationships and communities. The fora require nuanced dialectics, which speak within to those who are becoming involved. Linear logical and non‑dialectical thinking, however, is required for those on the outside, who still try to understand what they still deem external to themselves.

[26]Wilhelm Pauck, Luther: Lectures on Romans, p. 300.

[27]Again, in a letter from Prof. Scott Hendrix, I am reminded that Asecular@ here does not refer to an autonomous non-religious realm, which the word certainly brings to mind in its meaning today. Prof. Hendrix felt that for Luther and Melanchthon such a secular society, outside of corpus christanum, was still unthinkable. Thus perhaps the word could be understood in the Roman Catholic sense of a Asecular@ priest among the lay people, as opposed to a regular one detached from them. Thus in the same way a Asecular@ society as opposed to a Aregular@ society in the ecclesiastical sense of the terms could help sharpen the definition. Prof. Hendrix=s suggestion of the term Adeclericalized society@ still leaves the clergy in too predominant a role.

[28]Euan Cameron, The European Reformation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 422. Note the scope of the social change here. There is a school of sociologists who hold that the modern rise of Europe and its dominant position in the cultures of the world was achieved because of the break-through of the revolution of the Reformation, or more precisely, that central political and ecclesiastical power bungled defeating it.

[29]The power of definition can be very great or seem to have little relevance. Luther relegated the competence of the state to property and bodies as externals, and it was to be excluded from spiritual and religious matters, those matters that pertained to the soul and the internal. Luther defined and delimited the state theologically and distinguished it from the church. That certainly did not democratize his Saxon principality, but, in any case, he did not allow the state to define the church. Problematically, in the course of history that ensued, he could not enforce his definition on the state and exclude it from religious matters.

[30]Steven Ozment, Age of the Reformation 1250-1550, (New Haven: Yale University Press,1980), p. 436.

[31]In the Question and Answer period of his October 30, 1997 Lecture at Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary, Heiko Oberman hammered this point home. He listed many names of reformers, some of them martyred, whom no one remembers, because their theology was not established, and have been almost completely forgotten.      Without achieving some political niche and juridical inroads, a reformer willynilly becomes one of Troeltsche=s individual mystics who cannot leave a lasting social structure behind.

[32]Ozment, Age of the Reformation, p. 262.

[33]Patrick Collinson, The Religion of Protestants: the Church and English Society 1559-1625, (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1982),

p. 181-2.

[34]Gerhard Ebeling, Lutherstudien,vol. III, (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1985), inside frontal page.

[35]Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive Classification, (the University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 6. They are speaking of mythological consciousness, but Luther=s dialectic changed social forms one into another Awith a more or less complete absence of definite concepts.@

[36]Ozment, Age of the Reformation, p. 435.

[37]Martin Heckel, Das Problem der ASaekularisation@ in der Ref,@ in Irene Crusius, Saekularisation geistlicher Institutionen in 16. Und 18./19. Jahrhundert. , p. 45.

[38]Ibid., p. 36.

[39]Judith Jordan writes: Awe move past the particular to join in a place of commonality.@ Women=s Growth in Diversity: More Writings from the Stone Center, (New York: Guilford Press, 1997), p. 144. N. Berdyaev sees the universal in the particular. AThe age-long dispute between the nominalists and the realists reveals an insufficient grasp of the mystery of the particular.@ The Meaning of History, (New York: Meridian Books, the World Publishing Company, 1968),p. 25. If Luther had a philosophical bent of mind, and he didn=t, he would see it in, with, under and through the particular.

[40]Max Weber, Soziologie, Weltgeschichtliche Analysen, Politik, (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener Verlag, 1968), p. 188. Weber first instigated many of my thoughts here.

[41]From St Paul and Acts I have conflated two verses as the basis for this statement. AThere is no law given whereby we must be saved.@ from AIf a law had been given which could make alive, then righteousness would indeed be by the law.@ Galatians 3:21b. And Athere is no other name under heaven given whereby we must be saved.@ Acts 412b. I searched and searched Scriptures for the first verse here, but it must be my own conflation of the former and latter verses.

[42]Syndicalism may have already been tried in France, but it may still throw light on different aspects of this issue.

[43]Walter Altman Luther and Liberation: a Latin American Perspective , (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) and Richard Shaull, The Reformation and Liberation Theology, (Westminister: John Knox Press, 1991).

[44]WATR 5, No. 5378. (Fifth Volume of the Weimar Edition of the Table Talks).

[45]As a manifesto, the AFreedom of a Christian@ should not be related to the Bondage of the Will, but to the Babylonian Captivity of the Church, written just before it in 1520. The Bondage of the Will was written five years later.

[46]LW, vol. 44, p. 115.

[47]Judith Jordan, Women=s Growth in Diversity, p. 157.

[48]Wilhelm Pauck, Luther: Lectures on Romans, p. xxxvi,

or WA 54, 179-187.

[49]Judith Jordan, Women=s Growth in Diversity, p. 150.

[50]Fred R. Dallmayr, “Life‑World and Communicative Action,” Working Paper #20 ‑ Scott Mainwaring, editor, (University of Notre Dame, Helen Kellogg Institute, June 1984), p. 14.

[51]Ibid., p. 15.

[52]Ibid., p. 16‑17.

[53]Ibid., p. 15‑17. These short descriptions have been gleaned from the concise pages of E.R. Dallmayr’s study.

[54]Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: an Introduction to His Thought, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), chapter 12, pages 192-209.

[55]1 Corinthians 13:12b.


Written by peterkrey

December 4, 2009 at 5:44 am

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )


Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: